Indexation of Public Debt: Analytical Considerations and an Application to the Case of Brazil by Ilan Goldfajn et al.
Since the implementation of the Real Plan of 1994, the Brazil-
ian economy has been in the process of reducing its degree of in-
dexation. For more than three decades, Brazilian wages, rents,
financial securities, and other contracts were indexed to the price
level. The frequency of adjustment sometimes reached monthly or
even daily intervals, as in the case of some financial securities.
Brazilian indexation was inseparably associated with high rates
of inflation, which averaged 20 percent per month over the last three
decades. Inflation peaked at 82 percent per month during the hyper-
inflation (or megainflation) episode that occurred just before the Collor
Plan went into effect. The association between inflation and index-
ation has always provoked the debate about whether high and vari-
able inflation induces the indexation of the economy through the
breakdown of nominal contracts or whether indexation perpetuates
the inflationary process as argued by the inertial theory of inflation.1
Brazilian indexation has relied mainly on price-level indexation
as opposed to exchange rate indexation, which is common in several
INDEXATION OF PUBLIC DEBT: ANALYTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS AND AN APPLICATION
TO THE CASE OF BRAZIL
Ilan Goldfajn
Central Bank of Brazil and
Pontificia Universidad Católica do Rio de Janeiro
A similar version of this article was published in the Journal of International
Finance and Economics 5(1): 43-56, 2000. Copyright    2000 John Wiley & Sons, Lim-
ited. Published by permission of John Wiley & Sons Limited.
 At the time of writing, Ilan Goldfajn was affiliated with the International
Monetary Fund.
I would like to thank Trevor Alleyne, Márcio Garcia, Fernando Lefort, Klaus
Schmidt-Hebbel, and Andrés Velasco for very useful comments, and Ugo Fasano,
Patricia Menandro (Andima), Mário Mesquita, Áureo de Paula, and Evan Tanner for
kindly providing me with the data.
1. For this debate and the inertial inflation theory, see Arida and Resende (1985);
Simonsen (1983). See also Fischer and Summers (1989), who show how better protec-
tion may end up causing more inflation.
295
Indexation, Inflation, and Monetary Policy, edited by Fernando Lefort and Klaus
Schmidt-Hebbel, Santiago, Chile.    2002 Central Bank of Chile. C
C296 Ilan Goldfajn
other inflationary experiences. This peculiar feature has often been
justified by the institutionality of Brazilian indexation mechanisms.
These mechanisms, which date back to 1964, concentrated on price-
level indexation well before the country began to experience the high
inflation of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
This paper investigates Brazilian indexation in the financial sec-
tor over the last few decades, focusing, in particular, on indexation of
the public debt. Not only were government indexed securities a siz-
able portion of total securities, but they also took a central role (as
reference values and even as a unit of account) in spreading index-
ation mechanisms to other contracts in the economy, such as wages,
rents, taxes, and other private financial contracts. Important gov-
ernment indexed securities include the Obrigações Reajustáveis do
Tesouro Nacional (ORTN, later OTN) in 1964-89 and the Bonus do
Tesouro Nacional (BTN) in 1989-91.
This paper examines the composition of public debt among price-
level-indexed, nominal, and foreign-denominated securities. It argues
that the volatility of inflation, the level of total debt, the volatility of
the real exchange rate, and the correlation between expenditures
and inflation are important determinants of the composition of pub-
lic debt. To illustrate the main government incentives for issuing dif-
ferent public debt securities, the paper derives a simplified model of
debt indexation and denomination. It models a government that wants
to minimize both the fluctuation of the government budget and infla-
tion. The smoothing of the budget allows for smaller changes in the
tax rate, which implies higher utility for a representative consumer,
given convex distortion costs. The main trade-off can be summarized
as follows. On the one hand, issuing indexed securities allows the
government to minimize fluctuations of the real value of its debt as a
result of inflation variability, and it eliminates the temptation of in-
flating away the debt, which, in equilibrium, would lead to costly higher
inflation. On the other hand, if expenditure shocks are positively cor-
related to inflation shocks, nominal securities serve as implicit con-
tingent debt, thus reducing the value of debt when it is most needed.
The paper also investigates when it is preferable to issue foreign-
denominated securities. These are a better option when the real ex-
change rate does not fluctuate substantially and the correlation
between the real exchange rate shocks and government expenditures
is negative.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes
Brazilian experience with indexation. Section 2 presents the model
and section 3 looks at the composition of public debt in Brazil. Fi-
nally, section 4 concludes.297 Indexation of Public Debt
1. INDEXATION IN BRAZIL
Most of Brazil’s institutionalization of indexation dates back to
1964 during the first military government of President Castelo Branco.2
Before that date, two laws inhibited the emergence of automatic ad-
justments of contracts. The 1933 law passed by President Vargas
simply prohibited contracts from being stipulated in currencies other
than the milreis, the Brazilian currency at that time. Besides being a
nationalistic reaction in favour of the Brazilian sovereign monetary
unit, the law attempted to curb the established practice of foreign
companies indexing their prices to the exchange rate in order to neu-
tralize the effect of the devaluation of milreis on their receipts mea-
sured in foreign currency. From an economic point of view, the law
was based on the fact that exchange rate indexation significantly im-
paired the correction of balance-of-payments imbalances.
The second law, the Lei da Usura, established a nominal inter-
est rate ceiling of 12 percent. Since inflation generally exceeded
this ceiling, implying negative real rates, several mechanisms were
established to bypass the law. Long-term contracts were nonexist-
ent, however, since they required explicit indexation mechanisms
to deal with uncertainty regarding future inflation rates.
In 1964, the military government decided to reduce the distor-
tions in the economy resulting from these two laws. It therefore
introduced the correção monetária, a sophisticated indexation
mechanism that adjusted taxes, tariffs, and some financial contracts,
but not the exchange rate, wages, or bank deposits. The govern-
ment wanted to avoid the negative effects that the absence of in-
dexation had on public receipts and some financial contracts. The
absence of indexation on the exchange rate and wages was justified
to allow corrections of external imbalances and to avoid the infla-
tionary consequences of wage indexation.
The government also issued the Obrigações Reajustáveis do
Tesouro Nacional (ORTN). These were public debt securities that
had maturities ranging from one to twenty years and that were ad-
justed automatically for past inflation plus interest rates of 6 percent
per year. The objective was to avoid financing the deficit through
inflationary monetary expansion. The government believed that in-
dexing the debt would increase the demand for long-term securities
with fixed real rates and also allow for lower debt service, since it
2. This section draws on Simonsen (1995).298 Ilan Goldfajn
expected inflation to decline below market expectations embed-
ded in nominal interest rates paid on nominal securities.
The ORTN rapidly became an important reference value for other
contracts. Starting in 1964, mortgage contracts were adjusted by
the quarterly variation of the ORTN. This adjustment became known
as the UPC (the unit of reference of capital). Indexation spread to
almost all areas of the economy beginning in 1967, during the Costa
e Silva administration. Wages could no longer be denied automatic
indexation. The exchange rate policy was based on purchasing power
parity, and rents were adjusted every six months. In short, the
Brazilian economy became highly indexed.
Both indexation and inflation continued to increase under the
next two governments, from 1974 to 1985. The Mexican default and
the resulting crisis led to higher inflation and renewed efforts to imple-
ment restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. With the economy highly
indexed to past inflation, all attempts to reduce inflation through tra-
ditional policy instruments proved inappropriate.
The inflation process was thought to be inertial and its reduction
to require measures that eliminate widespread indexation in the
economy. In March 1986, the Cruzado Plan was implemented; this
was the first in a long series of stabilization plans. This first attempt
was unsuccessful, as were the following four plans (namely, the
Bresser, Summer, Collor I, and Collor II plans) (see figure 1). The
widespread indexation of contracts persisted, and inflation continued
to increase.
Figure 1. Inflation and Stabilization Plans




































































































































































h299 Indexation of Public Debt
Given the high levels of uncertainty with respect to inflation, nominal
contracts could not survive. The proportion of nominal public debt reached
zero during the megainflation process that preceded the Collor plan. Fig-
ure 2 shows the proportion of nominal debt in the hands of the public.
The Real Plan of July 1994 succeeded in reducing inflation. It was
an ingenious scheme of changing numeraires. In March 1994 nomi-
nal prices, wages, and other contracts were allowed to be quoted in a
unified reference value (URV) that would be replaced by a new cur-
rency, the real, in July 1994. Given that prices were already indexed
to several different references, the innovation of the URV was to
coordinate a unified unit of account that would substitute for all other
indexation mechanism. In the interim period after the introduction
of the URV and before its replacement by the real, it was expected
that relative prices would converge to their equilibrium value. This
was important for the second phase of the conversion, when the URV
would be transformed into real on a one-to-one basis and then pegged
to the dollar. This pegging, in fact, caused inflation to plunge from 46
percent in June 1994 to 1.5 percent in September 1994.
Lower inflation and deliberate government legislation to elimi-
nate the indexing of the economy together reduced the indexation of
short-term contracts substantially. In particular, the proportion of
indexed public debt diminished considerably. Figure 3 shows the com-
position of public debt after the Real Plan. The most striking fact is
that the proportion of nominal debt has increased significantly, as
one should expect from the increasingly stable inflation environment.
Figure 2. Nominal Debt in Brazil


















































































































































































The government decision to manage its public debt hinges on the
trade-off between time-consistency problems and tax-smoothing motives.
The former generate higher inflation than is optimal; credibly commit-
ting to low inflation therefore requires a structure based on securities
indexed to either foreign or domestic inflation. Tax smoothing calls for
issuing securities whose returns are negatively correlated with the tax
needs of the government. This may be the case of both nominal debt and
debt linked to a foreign currency.
The model uses a two-period example to derive the optimal com-
position of debt, including nominal, indexed, and foreign-denomi-
nated liabilities. The objective is to highlight the effects of both tax
smoothing and time-consistency considerations on the optimal com-
position in the simplest possible framework.3
The government’s objective is to minimize distortions from taxes
() and inflation (), both of which are assumed to be quadratic. There
are three sources of uncertainty: government spending, the real ex-
change rate, and the money demand are assumed to be stochastic.
Figure 3. Composition of Public Debt

























































































































































3. A multiperiod model is developed in Goldfajn (1996). For a related model of
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The latter introduces uncertainty with respect to the inflation rate:
Min . (1)
In the first period, the government chooses the composition of the
debt that it sells to the public, which will mature at the end of period
two. Three financial instruments are available: nominal bonds that are
sold at a nominal interest rate (i) and have a realized rate of return of
indexed bonds that pay a real rate of r plus the realized rate of infla-
tion (); and foreign-denominated bonds that pay the foreign in-
terest rate (i
*) plus the rate of depreciation (e) and have a realized
real rate of return in domestic currency equal to
.
No shocks or other financing decisions take place in the first period.
In the second period, the government decides about the optimal
money growth, given the level of debt and its composition. Subsequently,
the shocks are realized and taxes are levied to balance the budget.4
Consumers are in the background; they enter the model as risk-neu-
tral debt holders who demand a nominal interest rate that includes a
fixed real interest rate (r) plus the expected rate of inflation (e):5
(2)
The assumption of risk neutrality on the part of the investors is not
restrictive and is made for simplicity. Had I assumed risk-averse in-
vestors, they would have demanded an extra premium to hold nomi-
nal debt, but the main results would still hold.6
4. The budget has to balance since this is the last period. In the multiperiod
model, taxes and money growth are decided simultaneously, and the amount of debt
financing is adjusted for the shocks.
5. It is assumed that the real interest rate r is equivalent to that demanded on
indexed bonds. Even with risk neutrality, equation 2 is an approximation.
6. The results depend on the fact that the government wants to minimize the
fluctuations on the real value of its debt, since they generate costly changes in the tax
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The paper assumes uncovered interest rate parity:
. (3)
The money market equation determines the equilibrium inflation
rate:
, (4)
where is money supply growth created by the government and
represents velocity shocks that are assumed to be white noise. Here
the paper assumes that the government sets the money supply and
allows the nominal exchange rate to be determined endogenously.7
In equilibrium, rational investors will anticipate the government’s
decision on money supply growth. In the model, this implies that in-
vestors anticipate the average inflation generated by the government:
. (5)
The government’s budget constraint in the second period is that
taxes have to be equal to spending plus the real value of debt.8 Using
equations 2 and 3 and linearizing the budget constraint, I obtain
, (6)
where  and 
* are the proportions of nominal and foreign-denomi-
nated debt, respectively, B is the level of total debt, and
. (7)
Unexpected increases in inflation reduce nominal debt, and
unexpected real appreciations reduce foreign-denominated debt.
(Assume for simplicity that foreign inflation is zero.)
2.1 The Commitment Solution
The commitment solution is derived first. It is assumed that the
government can credibly commit in the first period to the decisions
7. An alternative and equivalent assumption is to allow the government to set
the rate of depreciation and let money be determined endogenously.
8. For simplicity, revenues from cash balance holdings are ignored.
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taken in the second period. In the first period, therefore, the
government will choose both the composition,  and *, and the
way it will finance itself between taxes and money growth in the
second period. Minimizing equation 1 subject to equations 5 and
6, I obtain the solution
, (8)
and the optimal proportions are
   and (9)
, (10)
where  denotes variance or covariance. It is assumed, for simplicity,
that r = 0.
The optimal money supply growth is zero because there are no
benefits from announcing a higher money path: nominal interest rates
will increase proportionally to higher inflation rates. Moreover, higher
inflation rates imply higher distortion costs, such that governments
will optimally commit to a zero inflation path.
The optimal proportion of the debt in nominal terms increases
with the covariance of inflation with spending but diminishes with
the variance of inflation. The intuition is that shocks to the other
components of the budget should be optimally hedged. On the one
hand, nominal debt is a good hedging device for the government when-
ever shocks to spending (or any other component of the primary defi-
cit) are positively correlated to inflation shocks and, therefore,
negatively correlated to the debt value. This avoids having to raise
taxes in bad states of the world. On the other hand, pure inflation
variance only introduces noise to the budget and induces the use of
more indexed debt. This will be the case in countries that face large
nominal shocks relative to real movements. The real value of the
their debt would fluctuate without a corresponding change in other
budgetary components. This induces the use of a high proportion of
indexed debt. The empirical section of the paper demonstrates that
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Having liabilities in foreign currency introduces another in-
strument for hedging, provided the correlation between the real
exchange rate and other domestic budget components (in this case
spending) are not zero. The trade-off with foreign-denominated
liabilities is that they may introduce more noise to the budget. If
the value of foreign currency used to peg part of the debt is not
very stable, that is, if there is a high variance of the real exchange
rate, taxes will fluctuate more to compensate the movements in
the real value of foreign-denominated debt.
The optimal proportions of nominal and foreign-denominated debt
derived above imply a specific relationship between them. A larger
share of nominal debt is associated with a larger share of foreign-
denominated debt depending on whether the covariance between in-
flation and the real exchange rate is positive or negative. If the
returns covary negatively, the two bonds are complements in the
government’s portfolio and they should increase proportionally.
2.2 Absence of Commitment
In this section, the assumption of commitment is relaxed. If the
government cannot commit its future behavior, it will face time-con-
sistency problems arising from the fact that it controls the average
inflation rate. Optimal behavior in the second period will be to inflate
some of the existing nominal debt. Ex ante, rational investors will
anticipate the future temptation to inflate, adjust expected inflation,
and demand a higher nominal interest rate. The inflation rate will be
higher in this equilibrium than in the previous one, in which the
government could commit itself.9
It is interesting to calculate the effect of future incentives to inflate
on the debt composition chosen in the first period. Solving backwards,
the government minimizes taxes and inflation costs in period two, but
takes as given the level of debt (B), its composition ( and *), and the
nominal interest rate (i). Minimizing equation 1 subject to equations 5
and 6 in the second period, I obtain the following solution:
     and (11)
, (12)
9. The government here cannot systematically affect the real exchange rate, q.
   B A m
*
  B G   305 Indexation of Public Debt
where is expected spending. The first-order condition of equation
11 uses equation 5. It says that in the second period the government
equates the expected marginal costs of raising taxes and inflation. The
equilibrium values of taxes and inflation, after shocks are realized, are
    and (13)
, (14)
where    and    are the unexpected shocks to inflation and the real
exchange rate.
In comparison with the previous case, the absence of commit-
ment increases the average rate of inflation, creating expected dis-
tortion costs. The incentive to inflate and the resulting equilibrium
inflation depend on the proportion of nominal debt outstanding, .
The government in period one would therefore need to adjust its
optimal  to reduce the incentive to inflate. Thus it will deviate from
the optimal proportion of nominal debt for hedging purposes. In other
words, the absence of other commitment technologies forces the gov-
ernment to use indexation to satisfy two objectives, hedging and com-
mitment, leaving it worse off.
The government in period one minimizes the loss function in pe-
riod two by choosing the appropriate indexation of debt. For this pur-
pose, it is possible to explicitly derive the loss function that the
government faces in the first period (dropping irrelevant terms and
using the values from equations 11 through 14):
Loss =
.
The first term on the right-hand side of the equation is the price
of not being able to commit to not inflating the nominal debt. It is the
traditional inflationary bias of time-consistent solutions. Indexing the
debt is one of the commitment technologies. The government will
now take into account this term when choosing its optimal propor-
tion of nominal debt. It is clear that setting  = 0 will completely
avoid this type of cost. The second and third terms are the hedging
role of nominal debt and foreign-denominated debt, respectively. If
inflation (or the real exchange rate) and government spending are
positively correlated, tax rates will fluctuate less and governments
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can reduce distortions in the economy. It is thus optimal to have
contingent debt that reduces the real value of debt when financing
needs are higher. Nominal and foreign-denominated debt are implic-
itly contingent debt. The last term on the right-hand side of the equa-
tion works against issuing both nominal and foreign-denominated
debt. If the variance of inflation or the real exchange rate is high,
it will imply large changes in the real value of debt, which will
increase the variance of tax rates. Setting  = 0 and 
* = 0, com-
pletely indexing the debt, eliminates this last effect.
The government minimizes the loss function in the first period
and obtains the optimal proportion of debt in nominal and foreign
currency:
     and  (16)
. (17)
This optimal value has an additional term, 2A, when compared
to the commitment case. The government now has to take into ac-
count the marginal cost, in terms of higher average inflation, of not
indexing one extra unit of debt. This additional cost will reduce the
optimal proportion of nominal debt. The higher the term 2A, the
more tempted the government appears to be to inflate the debt. To
credibly commit itself to not inflate, the government will thus use a
higher proportion of indexed debt. This will reduce the amount of
nominal debt available for hedging purposes, deviating further from
the commitment solution. The 2A term depends on both the level of
total debt and average spending. If the total debt, B, is larger, the
government is more tempted to inflate the debt. The higher the debt,
therefore, the lower the optimal proportion of nominal debt. This
effect is similar to the one derived in Blanchard and Missale (1994).
The effect of the debt level on foreign-denominated debt is more
ambiguous. First, there is the direct effect of the level of debt on the
composition through the hedging mechanisms. For given variances and
covariances and a given level of shocks to spending, the higher the
total debt, the lower is the proportion of foreign-denominated debt
needed to obtain the same amount of hedging. Second, the impact of
 
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the term 2A (through  in equation 17) depends on whether the
covariance between inflation and the real exchange rate is positive or
negative. The latter also defines whether foreign-denominated debt
and nominal debt are complements or substitutes in the government’s
portfolio.
I could restrict the values of  and * to between 0 and 1, which
means that there is no negative debt in any component of the debt,
that is, governments do not hold net positive claims with the private
sector. In this case corner solutions may arise.
Two relevant issues on debt management are not stressed in the
model. First, governments frequently claim that they manage debt
to minimize borrowing costs. However, if markets work efficiently
and there is no free lunch, any gains from shifting to cheaper securi-
ties should imply higher risks to the government.10 Since higher risks
to the government ultimately imply higher risks to society (for ex-
ample, through a higher probability of raising taxes to close the bud-
get), it is not clear that anyone gains from this strategy. In the model,
I have omitted this aspect by assuming risk-neutral investors and
equivalent real returns for all the securities. Second, governments
can, in principle, smooth shocks intertemporally by raising debt in
bad moments and repaying debt in good times. The nature of the
shock then becomes irrelevant, and debt composition is indetermi-
nate. In a previous paper, I show that even if governments smooth
taxes through time, there is a role for smoothing taxes through states
of nature; this is the hedging argument described above (see Goldfajn,
1996). The relative importance of the hedging argument is an empiri-
cal matter. The following section evaluates the importance of hedg-
ing and credibility arguments in the case of Brazil.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The implications of the model can be summarized as follows:
• The proportion of nominal debt should decrease with the
level of total debt.
• Nominal debt should be negatively related to the variance of
inflation.
10. This occurred, for example, when the Mexican central bank shifted from
domestically denominated CETES to dollar-denominated Tesobonos and implicitly
assumed the exchange rate risk.308 Ilan Goldfajn
• Nominal debt should increase when the covariance of inflation
and spending is larger, whereas foreign-denominated debt should
increase when the covariance between the real exchange rate and
spending is larger.
• Foreign-denominated debt should be negatively related to the
variance of the real exchange rate.
This section tests the main determinants of public debt index-
ation and denomination. The analysis focuses on the joint behavior
of the macroeconomic series that determines the budget constraint
of the government (that is, government spending and inflation),
the level of the debt, and its composition for Brazil.
3.1 Data
The paper uses monthly public debt data for the period 1980-97,
obtained directly from the Central Bank of Brazil and from the his-
torical series published in Andima (1992). The data set incorporates
disaggregated data on the composition of public debt between in-
dexed and nominal debt held by the public (net of the holdings of
the Central Bank).
The paper also uses monthly data on the real exchange rate,
inflation, and spending. Inflation is measured by changes in the
wholesale price index, and spending is the total disbursment of the
government net of interest rate payments. The original source of
the series is the Central Bank of Brazil. The series of real exchange
rate values is multilateral, based on the wholesale price index; it is
calculated in Goldfajn and Valdés (1996).
3.2 First Stage: Obtaining the Variance and
Covariance Series
The paper first obtains the four variance and covariance series
for Brazil: the variance of inflation, the covariance of inflation with
government spending, the variance of the real exchange rate, and
the covariance of the real exchange rate with spending. The vari-
ance-covariance structure of innovations in government spending,
real exchange rate, and inflation was obtained for Brazil by per-
forming a vector autoregression (VAR) of these variables. The vari-
ances were obtained from the residuals of the VAR. In the same
manner, the covariances were obtained from the off-diagonal-terms
covariance matrix of the residuals.309 Indexation of Public Debt
The variance and covariance series were estimated with a se-
ries of rolling VAR estimations. A new VAR was estimated for each
year, with a different data set available to estimate the covariance
matrix. For each estimation, the last forty observations and two
lags were used. In this way a time series of estimates of the four
relevant variances and covariances were obtained. The series start
in January 1980 and end in December 1997.
Three series of correlations are relevant to the discussion. First,
the correlation between spending and real exchange rate innova-
tions in Brazil tends to be positive in most of the sample, giving a
hedging role to the foreign-denominated debt. This is an expected
result, since higher spending increases the demand for nontradables,
which appreciates the currency. Second, the correlation between
spending and inflation is positive at the beginning of the sample and
at the very end (1980-85 and 1994-96), but it becomes negative in
the late 1980s when inflation reached hiperinflationary levels. The
reason is that for low and medium levels of inflation, either govern-
ment spending created pressures on prices or, in the reverse cau-
sality, increases in prices generated more government spending.
In this case, nominal debt played a role as a hedging device. When
inflation rates became very high, however, shocks to inflation tended
to reduce government spending, since wages and payments in the
public sector were not perfectly indexed to the price level. Finally,
the correlation between inflation and the real exchange rate is posi-
tive in the whole sample. Because prices and exchange rates were
not perfectly flexible, positive shocks to inflation did not always trans-
late into proportional shocks to the nominal devaluation rates, which
led to real appreciations of the currency. Nominal and foreign-
denominated debt were therefore substitutes in the government
portfolio.
3.3 Second Stage: OLS Regressions
The second stage uses the estimated variances and covariances
obtained in the first stage to estimate their influence on the choice of
 and *, in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The period of
estimation is 1980-95, and the frequency is monthly.
The proportion of nominal debt is regressed against the variance
of inflation, the covariance of spending and inflation, the level of pub-
lic debt as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP), a constant,
a time trend, and dummy variables to control for both the Collor and310 Ilan Goldfajn
Real plans.11 The dummies are included because both plans caused
important structural breaks with a potentially important influ-
ence on the composition of public debt. The Collor Plan of March
1990 froze a good part of the financial securities available, includ-
ing public debt securities. The Real Plan represented a structural
break from the previous inflationary environment; it therefore had
potentially important effects on the composition of public debt.
Indexed debt in Brazil was not a guaranteed positive real return to
its holders. Figure 4 shows the real value of an indexed bond from
1976 to 1991. It is clear from the figure that indexation in Brazilian
indexed securities was far from perfect. The indexation mechanism
lagged behind actual inflation and did not protect the real value of this
type of debt. An interesting way to test the effect of imperfect index-
ation is to observe the behavior of the average maturity of all public
debt, including indexed debt. If indexation is imperfect, agents will
require shorter maturities, even in indexed debt, to avoid large fluc-
tuations in the real value of debt. I can therefore repeat the OLS
regressions above using the average maturity as the dependent vari-
able, since the predictions of the model can be equally applied to the
average maturity of debt. The effects of the variance of inflation, the
level of public debt, and the covariance of inflation and spending on the
real value of debt should be correlated to the average maturity of debt.
Figure 4. Real Value of Government Indexed Bond
(January 1976 =100)
Source: E. Tanner, “Intertemporal Solvency and Indexed Debt: Evidence from Brazil”, Journal of International
Money and Finance 14(4): 549-73, 1995
11. Neto (1996) runs similar regressions to test the model outlined in Goldfajn (1996).
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Finally, the proportion of foreign-denominated debt is regressed
against the variance of the real exchange rate, the covariance of
spending and the real exchange rate, the level of public debt as a
proportion of GDP, a constant, a time trend, and dummy variables
to control for both the Collor and Real plans.
3.4 Results
The results of the regression are presented in tables 1 through 3.
The expected signs are listed in the bottom row.
In table 1, the level of debt seems to have a significant effect
and in the direction predicted by the model. A higher level of debt
reduces the long nominal proportion of debt. This supports the
model, since having a higher total debt affects the incentives to
inflate and influences the decision on whether to issue nominal
debt.
The variance of inflation has a negative effect on the propor-
tion of nominal debt, as uncertainty with regard to inflation tends
to reduce maturities. As predicted by the model, a high variance of
inflation should reduce the amount of nominal debt. This phenom-
enon was an important feature of the Brazilian economy, in which
the deepening of financial indexation was positively correlated
to the uncertainties that accompanied high inflation rates.
Inflation –0.05 0.26 –0.14 ... ... ...  0.30
(–3.8) (4.93) (–2.38) ... ... ... ...
Inflation and –0.06 0.27 –0.21 20.3 ... ...  0.34
spending (–3.86) (5.01) (–3.39) (1.7) ... ... ...
Real exchange –0.07 0.24 –0.20 20.1  19.1 ...  0.40
rate (–4.93) (3.48) (–3.09) (1.7) (2.85) ... ...
Real exchange –0.06 0.23 –0.11 18.5 20.85  1.04  0.44
rate and spending (–4.78) (3.41) (–1.54) (1.56) (2.9)  (2.64) ...
Expected sign – ... – + + + ...
Table 1. Determinants of Debt Indexation in Brazil, 1980–95a
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The dependent variable is the proportion of nominal debt. A constant was included in each regression;
t statistics were corrected by the Newey-West consistent matrix and are shown in parentheses.
Collor I Real
Explanatory Plan Plan
variable D/Y Trend    dummy dummy g R2312 Ilan Goldfajn
Inflation  –0.03  0.12  –0.07 ... ... ...  0.62
 (–6.6)  (6.99)  (–5.02) ... ... ... ...
Inflation and  –0.03  0.12  –0.09  5.43 ... ...  0.65
spending  (–6.9)  (7.14)  (–5.73)  (3.79) ... ... ...
Real exchange  –0.03  0.13  –0.09  5.46  –1.94 ...  0.65
rate  (–5.83)  (4.41)  (–6.34)  (3.88)  (–0.59) ...  ...
Real exchange  –0.03  0.11  –0.06  4.98  0.18  0.27  0.65
rate and spending  (–6.17)  (3.94)  (–4.43)  (3.59)  (0.06)  (2.57) ...
Expected sign  – ...  –  +  +  + ...
The covariance with spending also fit the predictions of the
model. The coefficient on the covariance of inflation and spending
have the correct sign: it is positive and significant at the 5 percent
level. This confirms the prediction of the model that the higher
this covariance, the higher the proportion of nominal debt.
The results further show that both the Collor and Real plans
increased the proportion of nominal public debt, the former through
a compulsory freezing of financial assets and the latter through a
structural change in the inflationary regime.
Table 2 presents the regressions with the average maturity of
public debt. The coefficients on debt-to-GDP ratio, variance of infla-
tion, the covariance of inflation with spending, and the Collor plan
have the same signs as predicted by the model and are equivalent to
the ones obtained in the regressions presented in table 1.
Table 3 contains the results of the regressions with foreign-de-
nominated debt. The coefficients on the variance of the real exchange
rate and the covariance of the real exchange rate with spending have
the right signs but are insignificant. The level of debt has a negative
effect on the proportion of foreign denominated debt. Credibility ar-
guments should imply a positive sign.12
To take into account the covariance between the residuals of the
regressions that underlie the results in tables 1 and 3, a seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) system was estimated. The results are
similar to those obtained in the previous tables (see table 4).
Table 2. Determinants of Debt Maturity in Brazil, 1986–95a
12. The regressions in tables 1 and 3 were repeated using the amount of
nominal or foreign-denominated debt as the independent variable. This isolates
the direct negative effect of total debt from the credibility effect that I want to
stress. The results are qualitatively identical.
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The dependent variable is the average maturity of debt. A constant was included in each regression;
t statistics were corrected by the Newey-West consistent matrix and are shown in parentheses.
Collor I Real
Explanatory Plan Plan
variable D/Y Trend    dummy dummy  g R2313 Indexation of Public Debt
Inflation  –0.01  0.05 ... ... ... ...  0.38
 (–2.87)  (4.81) ... ... ... ... ...
Inflation and  –0.02  0.10  –0.27 ... ... ...  0.52
spending  (–2.42)  (5.13)  (–1.12) ... ... ... ...
Real exchange  –0.02  0.10  –0.23  –2.34  1.72 ...  0.52
rate  (–2.96)  (4.12)  (–0.88)  (–0.87)  (0.84) ... ...
Real exchange  –0.02  0.10  –0.21  –2.36  1.66  0.11  0.44
rate and spending  (–2.95)  (4.16)  (–0.84)  (–0.87)  (0.80)  (0.88) ...
Expected sign + ... – ... ... + ...
Table 3. Determinants of Foreign Denominated Debt in
Brazil, 1980–95a
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The dependent variable is the proportion of foreign-denominated debt. A constant was included in each
regression; t statistics were corrected by the Newey-West consistent matrix and are shown in parentheses.
Table 4. Determinants of Debt Composition, Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR) System Estimationa
D/Y  –0.05  –0.01
 (–6.7)  (–6.2)
Trend  0.25  0.11
 (8.9)  (7.8)
   –0.09  0.001
 (–2.04)  (0.07)
g  1.4  0.36
 (2.87)  (3.68)
RER  0.13  –0.10
 (0.42)  (–0.97)
RERg  –1.57  –0.02
 (–3.63)  (–0.11)
Collor I Plan dummy  16.9  –0.64
 (3.22)  (–0.38)
Real Plan dummy  21.6  1.81
 (5.27)  (1.36)
R2  0.47  0.57
Foreign-denominated
Variable Nominal debt debt
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. A constant was included in the regressions; t statistics in parentheses.
Collor I Real
Explanatory Plan Plan
variable D/Y Trend RER  dummy dummy RERg R2314 Ilan Goldfajn
4. CONCLUSIONS
Since the implementation of the Real Plan, the share of public
indexed debt has dropped from 70 to 30 percent of total debt, while
the shares of both nominal and foreign-denominated debt have in-
creased. This paper offers a simple model and preliminary evidence
to explain these facts.
The paper develops a model of public debt management that con-
centrates on hedging and credibility motives. The model demonstrates
that indexed debt should be issued to enhance the credibility of the
government or to avoid unnecessary fluctuations in the real value of
debt as a result of variable inflation rates. In contrast, nominal debt
serves the purpose of hedging shocks to the budget when inflation is
positively correlated to spending. Foreign-denominated debt may also
serve as a hedging device if the real exchange rate is positively corre-
lated with spending and does not fluctuate substantially.
The evidence from OLS regressions confirms that the variance of
inflation, the size of the public debt, and the correlations of inflation
with spending are important determinants of public debt indexation
in Brazil.315 Indexation of Public Debt
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